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FOURTH AND SHORT ON EQUALITY: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF THE 
NFL’S USE OF THE WONDERLIC INTELLIGENCE TEST AND THE CASE 
FOR A FOOTBALL-SPECIFIC TEST 
CHRISTOPHER HATCH 
Prior to being selected in the NFL draft, a player must undergo a 
series of physical and mental evaluations, including the Wonderlic 
Intelligence Test.  The twelve-minute test, which measures “cognitive 
ability,” has been shown to have a disparate impact on minorities in 
various employment situations.  This Note contends that the NFL’s use of 
the Wonderlic also has a disparate impact because of its effect on a 
player’s draft status and ultimately his salary.  The test cannot be justified 
by business necessity because there is no correlation between a player’s 
Wonderlic score and their on-field performance.  As such, this Note calls 
for the creation of a football-specific intelligence test that would be less 
likely to have a disparate impact than the Wonderlic, while also being 
sufficiently job-related and more reliable in predicting a player’s success. 
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 FOURTH AND SHORT ON EQUALITY: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF THE 
NFL’S USE OF THE WONDERLIC INTELLIGENCE TEST AND THE CASE 
FOR A FOOTBALL-SPECIFIC TEST 
CHRISTOPHER HATCH∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every February, hundreds of college football players are invited to 
Indianapolis to participate in the NFL combine, the league’s evaluation 
program for potential NFL players.  This “cattlecall”1 for NFL hopefuls 
serves as an opportunity for personnel from every team to assess players’ 
speed, strength, durability and acumen before determining whom to select 
in the NFL draft.  Invitees to the combine are evaluated in many activities 
including a 40-yard dash, bench press, vertical jump, injury examination, 
personal interviews and an intelligence test.2   
Every aspect of a player’s makeup is analyzed over the course of two 
days—nothing is immaterial.3  There can be tremendous payoffs for those 
who do well; successful performance can lead to a relatively obscure 
prospect being drafted, or an already established player can increase his 
value and ultimately his paycheck with an impressive showing.4  Tenths of 
a second can literally equate to hundreds of thousands of dollars in gains or 
losses.5 
Testing a potential NFL player’s speed, strength and overall health is 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Brigham Young University, B.S. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 
Candidate, 2009.  Many thanks to Professor Peter Siegelman for his comments and guidance 
throughout the writing of this Note.  All errors contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 Pete Prisco, Cattle Call Under Way for Hopefuls at NFL Combine, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Feb. 
21, 1999, at C9, available at LEXIS, News Library, FLATUN File.  
2 Ryan Christopher DeVault, Wonderlic Test Begins at the 2009 NFL Combine; Every Prospect is 
Required to Take It (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1494254/wonderlic_ 
test_begins_at_the_2009_nfl.html?cat=14; Nathan Rush, NFL Combine-Offense, ATHLON SPORTS, 
Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.athlonsports.com/pro-football/16371/nfl-combine-offense; NFL 
Scouting Combine, http://www.nfl.com/combine/workouts (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).  
3 Ryan Rigmaiden, Michael Allan Post-Combine Interview!, (Feb. 27, 2007), 
http://sea.scout.com/2/622322.html (noting that potential NFL prospect Michael Allan was asked by 
the Philadelphia Eagles staff in an interview “who [he] would call if [he] was thrown in jail and was 
given . . . one phone call.”). 
4 Michael Allan played college football in near-obscurity at Division III Whitworth University, 
but due to his exceptional performance at the combine he was drafted by the Kansas City Chiefs in the 
seventh round of the 2007 NFL draft.  See id.; ESPN NFL DraftTracker, Round 7, 
http://insider.espn.go.com/nfldraft/draft/tracker/round?round=7&draftyear=2007 (last visited Mar. 18, 
2009). 
5 Jim Corbett, At the NFL Combine: Officials Reassess Wonderlic’s Value, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/draft/2007-02-22-combine-notebook_x. 
htm (noting that running back Maurice Jones-Drew ran a 4.39 second 40-yard dash at the 2006 
combine, which the Jaguars personnel suggested was a significant reason he was drafted 60th overall). 
 1672 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1669 
undoubtedly essential in evaluating potential; however, the combine also 
tests for “intelligence,” via the Wonderlic Personnel Test (Wonderlic), a 
controversial IQ test that has been shown to have a disparate impact on 
minority groups in a variety of employment situations.6  The theory of 
disparate impact holds that it is unlawful under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act for an employer to use a facially neutral practice, such as a test 
or educational requirement, which has an adversely disproportional impact 
on a protected group, even without any discriminatory intent on the 
employer’s part.7  If the test has an adverse impact, the employer can avoid 
liability only if the test is shown to be “job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”8 
In the framework of the NFL Draft, the Wonderlic almost certainly has 
a disparate impact because of its effect in determining draft ranking and 
ultimately a player’s salary.  Moreover, the test also does not appear to 
accurately forecast future performance in the NFL.  As such, this Note 
concludes that the NFL’s use of the Wonderlic cannot be justified by 
business necessity and would likely fail a Title VII disparate impact 
challenge.  This Note calls for the creation of a football-specific 
“intelligence” examination that would be less likely to have a disparate 
impact on a player’s draft status and salary.  Such a test would also be 
sufficiently job-related and more reliable in predicting a player’s success.   
This Note will give a brief explanation of the Wonderlic test and its 
relation to disparate impact law.  Then, in order to show that the test has a 
disparate impact on NFL draft pick selection, the Note will focus on the 
relationship between quarterbacks’ Wonderlic scores, their draft positions, 
and their performance on the field.  Quarterbacks’ Wonderlic scores are the 
easiest to procure and the most useful to examine because their on-field 
performance is the most straightforward to evaluate and the position is 
generally regarded as the most cerebral.9  If the test does not predict 
quarterbacks’ future performance, a fortiori, it will be even less likely to 
predict the performance of players in less intellectually-demanding 
positions.  In the interest of full disclosure, the data used in my analysis is 
not publicly available, but has been leaked through many different sources.  
                                                                                                                          
6 Michael A. Reiter, Compensating for Race or National Origin in Employment Testing, 8 LOY. 
U. CHI. L. J. 687, 699–702 (1977). 
7 See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 109–
10 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that “disparate treatment focuses on discriminatory intent while adverse 
impact focuses on discriminatory consequences”). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
9 Michael Callans, President of Wonderlic Consulting stated that “[s]electing a new quarterback is 
like hiring a president for a company . . . They need the intelligence to think on their feet, evaluate all 
of their options and understand the impact their actions will have on the outcome of the game.”  
Intelligence Testing in the National Football League, NFL Testing Provides Valuable Lesson for All 
Employees (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.assessmentpsychology.com/nfl.htm [hereinafter Intelligence 
Testing]. 
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Because the data is not completely reliable, I will only be offering a 
preliminary evaluation of the test’s link to performance on the field. 
II.  BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WONDERLIC 
The Wonderlic Personnel Test was developed by industrial 
psychologist Eldon F. Wonderlic and first distributed in 1937.10  The test, 
which measures “cognitive ability,” contains fifty questions that become 
progressively harder and must be completed in twelve minutes.11  
Wonderlic, Inc.—a for-profit corporation that markets the test—claims that 
the test is long enough to ensure validity while short enough not to 
intimidate.12  Wonderlic representatives say that the test is administered 
3,000,000 times a year, for different levels of employment, and by about 
7,000 of their clients.13  The score is calculated by simply totaling the 
number of correct answers in the allotted time;14 a score of twenty-one is 
equivalent to the intelligence of a high school graduate and constitutes an 
approximate average score in the United States.15  The NFL is the only 
sports league that uses the test.16  
The history of the Wonderlic’s use in the NFL is unclear, but one of its 
most ardent proponents was Tom Landry, former head coach of the Dallas 
Cowboys in the early 1970’s.17  Landry, who wanted to evaluate more than 
just on-field performance, contended that players who used their minds 
would have a strategic advantage over the other teams in the league.18  
After the Cowboys began using the test, other teams followed suit, leading 
to today’s NFL-wide administration of the Wonderlic at the combine.19   
III.  THE NFL’S USE OF THE WONDERLIC AND DISPARATE IMPACT 
The claim of disparate impact in employment discrimination law arose 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made any forms of 
discrimination in the workplace illegal.20  Title VII forbids discrimination 
in all aspects of employment on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
                                                                                                                          
10 Wonderlic: Our History, http://www.wonderlic.com/about-us.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).  
11 Darren Rovell, Grading Wonderlic and the Best Sports Video Game, (Feb. 21, 2007), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/17258325; Wonderlic: Our History, supra note 10. 
12 Wonderlic: Our History, supra note 10. 
13 Rovell, supra note 11. 
14 McDonald P. Mirabile, Intelligence and Football: Testing for Differentials in Collegiate 
Quarterback Passing Performance and NFL Compensation, 8 SPORT J. 2005, available at 
http://www.thesportjournal.org/tags/2005?page=2.  
15 Reiter, supra note 6, at 702; Rovell, supra note 11. 
16 Rovell, supra note 11.  
17 Intelligence Testing, supra note 9. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Michael S. Beer, Title VII Today: The Shift Away From Equality, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 525, 
525 (1987). 
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sex, and religion and has been developed through two separate legal 
theories—disparate treatment and disparate impact.21  Disparate treatment, 
which encompasses intentional acts of employment discrimination and 
may be applicable in relation to the NFL in other respects, is not a focus of 
this Note.22   
As stated above, the theory of disparate impact holds that it is unlawful 
for an employer to use a facially neutral practice, such as a test or 
educational requirement, which has a disproportionately adverse impact on 
a protected group, even without a showing of the employer’s 
discriminatory intent.23  The seminal disparate impact case is Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., in which the Supreme Court struck down an employer’s 
hiring and promotion practices as being in violation of § 703 of Title VII.24  
In that case, the plaintiffs challenged an employer’s requirement of a 
passing score on two intelligence tests (one of which was the Wonderlic) 
or a high school education as a condition for employment or promotion.25  
The Griggs Court noted that Section 703(h) provides it shall not be an 
“unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon 
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such 
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended 
or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin . . . .”26  But the Court also held that tests, even if impartial on their 
face and in terms of intent, may be illegal under Title VII if their results are 
disproportionately adverse to minority groups.27  This adverse impact was 
apparent when the Court noted EEOC studies finding that the use of 
intelligence tests, including the Wonderlic, resulted in passage rates for 
whites of fifty-eight percent, compared to six percent for blacks.28   
                                                                                                                          
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL LAW 
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 7 (4th ed. 2004). 
22 See Tom Gage, National Pastime Strikes Out with Black Athletes; Kids in Michigan, U.S. 
Choose the Flash of NFL and NBA Over Baseball’s Slow Pace, THE DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 10, 2005 at 
1A, available at LEXIS, News Library, DETNWS File (noting that in 2004, sixty-nine percent of NFL 
players were black).  For a cogent analysis of racial discrimination in the NFL, see Jason Chung, Racial 
Discrimination and African-American Quarterbacks in the National Football League 1968–1999, 
MCGILL U. 4–9 (NOV. 29, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=835204.  The article points to two flawed arguments that have been used to show why 
African-American quarterbacks are not as successful in the NFL—the option argument and the 
intelligence argument.  Id.  The option argument notes that the NFL uses a pass-oriented offensive 
system which is more complex than option offenses that many black quarterbacks used in high school 
or college.  Id. at 4.  An option offense relies primarily on a quarterback’s athletic ability to run the ball 
himself or choose to lateral the ball to a teammate.  Id. at 5.  The author notes that there was prejudice 
against option quarterbacks because of the simplicity of the offense.  Id. at 6.  The intelligence 
argument, driven by the use of the Wonderlic, will be examined in this Note. 
23 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 109–10. 
24 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
25 Id. at 425–26, 428.   
26 Id. at 426 n.1 (citations omitted).  
27 Id. at 431.   
28 Id. at 430 n.6 (citations omitted). 
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The Griggs Court concluded,  
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation.  The touchstone is business necessity.  If an 
employment practice which operates to exclude [members of 
a protected group] cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.29   
To determine business necessity, the Court examined the evidence and 
noted that employees who had not graduated from high school or who had 
not take the intelligence tests had still been able to satisfactorily perform 
the duties of their job and that the company had not made a showing that 
the promotion requirements fulfilled a “genuine business need.”30 
The Supreme Court clarified the theory of disparate impact in 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, a case that established the framework with 
which to bring a claim.31  The facts of the case were similar to those in 
Griggs; in order to receive a promotion or seniority advancement an 
employee had to have a high school diploma and pass two intelligence 
tests, one of which was the Wonderlic.32  Intending to show that their tests 
met the business necessity standard, the defendants hired an industrial 
psychologist to validate the job relatedness of its testing program.33  The 
study, validated at the trial level, showed a statistically significant 
correlation between test scores and ratings from supervisors,34 but the 
Supreme Court rejected the legitimacy of the study based on, among other 
factors, the subjectivity of these ratings.35   
The Court proceeded to elaborate on the allocation of the burden of 
proof in a disparate impact claim by holding that the complaining party 
must “ma[k]e out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that 
the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial 
pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants.”36  From 
there, the employer must show that their employment tests which have a 
discriminatory effect have a “manifest relationship” to the job in 
question.37  If the employer meets their burden of showing that their test is 
                                                                                                                          
29 Id. at 431.  
30 Id. at 432. 
31 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
32 Id. at 410–11. 
33 Id. at 411. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. at 431–36 (noting that the validation study was also defective because it produced an 
“odd patchwork of results” in that the test only showed significant correlation in two of the eight skilled 
lines of progression within the company, it mainly focused on the top job groups, and only dealt with 
job-experienced white workers and not job applicants, who were often non-white). 
36 Id. at 425. 
37 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). 
 1676 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1669 
job related, “it remains open to the complaining party to show that other 
tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, 
would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship.’”38 
This framework for disparate impact was ultimately codified through 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as Section 703(k) of Title VII.39  First, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case that the defendant “uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”40  At that point, the 
burden of production and persuasion is shifted to the employer to show that 
their practice or selection device is “job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity . . . .”41  If the employer is 
successful at this stage, the plaintiff then has the burden to show that the 
employer refused to implement an alternative hiring practice that could 
achieve the same legitimate business goal with less adverse impact.42 
The difficulty of making a prima facie case in an NFL draft context is 
that unlike Griggs and other cases in which the Wonderlic has been 
administered to potential employees, NFL teams apparently do not use a 
cutoff score; instead they employ the test as one factor among many in 
determining draft position (and ultimately, salary).  When sufficiently high 
cutoff scores are used, the test can indisputably have a disparate impact on 
minorities.43  For example, if an employer’s minimum passing score is 21, 
the level of a high school graduate, 75.1% of all black applicants would be 
excluded compared to 34.9% of all white applicants44—certainly enough to 
show a significant disparity. 
This analysis cannot be directly applied to the NFL’s use of the 
Wonderlic, however, because the test does not form a rigid barrier to 
employment; if an individual’s athletic ability is high enough, he will be 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). 
39 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 110. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  Alternatively, if the complaining party cannot separate 
the respondent’s employment practices in order to show a specific practice that has a disparate impact, 
“the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.”  Id. §2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
41 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
42 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
43 See Reiter, supra note 6, at 701 (noting that a “very stable differential in raw scores achieved 
by Negro Applicant Populations exists . . . These mean score differentials are, as other researchers have 
noted in the study of mental ability, about one standard deviation apart when comparisons of 
Caucasians and Negroes are studied.”) (citation omitted).  Unfortunately, my research could not find 
any more recent data on white or black Wonderlic performance.  However, significant research on test 
score disparities between races is readily available.  See Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The 
Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE AFRICAN AMERICAN PREDICAMENT 63, 63 (Christopher H. 
Foreman, Jr. ed., 1999) (noting that “African Americans score lower than European Americans on 
vocabulary, reading, and math tests as well as on tests that claim to measure scholastic aptitude and 
intelligence” and that “the typical American black still scores below 75 percent of American whites on 
almost every standardized test.”). 
44 Reiter, supra note 6, at 702. 
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drafted regardless of his score on the Wonderlic.  Nevertheless, it is 
indisputable that the Wonderlic often plays a factor in a team’s decision of 
whom to draft,45 and therefore, how much money to offer a player after he 
has been drafted.  The fact that there is not a cutoff score should not 
preclude a plaintiff’s prima facie case.  If the test is used to determine draft 
position, it will invariably have a disparate impact on a player’s salary in 
the NFL; on average minorities will score lower on the test and thus be 
drafted later leading to a decrease in salary, or a player’s poor performance 
on the test could lead to them not being drafted at all.46  Proving wage-
based disparate impact in this context presents unique challenges that will 
be discussed below.   
Although disparate impact claims are generally developed through 
examining impacts on a group, the Supreme Court has stressed that the 
essential protection provided by Title VII is the opportunity for the 
individual to be treated fairly.47  The notion of protecting the individual’s 
opportunity is crucial in evaluating the NFL’s use of the Wonderlic.  The 
NFL would likely argue that many black athletes have scored poorly on the 
Wonderlic and still been drafted in the first round, including quarterbacks 
Vince Young,48 Jason Campbell,49 and Akili Smith,50 thus suggesting the 
absence of any disparate impact in the selection process.  However, there 
are players whose draft status possibly tumbled as a result of poor 
                                                                                                                          
45 Michael Callans, President of Wonderlic Consulting, said he thinks “all teams look at 
[Wonderlic scores] to some degree.  I haven’t had a team tell me that they didn’t think it was of any 
value at all.”  See Rovell, supra note 11. 
46 The prima facie case of disparate impact in this context cannot be rebutted by the fact that a 
strong majority of the players in the NFL are black.  This argument, known as a “bottom line” defense, 
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445, 453 (1982).  In that case, 
an employer used a written examination, shown to have a disparate impact, in its promotion decisions.  
Id. at 443–44, n.3.  The employer raised a bottom-line defense, asserting that despite the written test, 
22.9% of blacks who passed the examination were promoted, compared to 13.5% of whites, so that in 
the end, blacks were overrepresented among those who actually got jobs.  Id. at 444.  The Court turned 
to the language of Title VII which states that it is unlawful to “‘limit . . . or classify . . . applicants for 
employment . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities.’”  Id. at 448 (emphasis original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(2006)). 
47 Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.   
48 Perhaps the most notorious example of a Wonderlic score being leaked occurred when 
University of Texas quarterback Vince Young’s score at the 2006 NFL combine surfaced.  Young, 
whose draft stock rose one month earlier after almost single-handedly beating the University of 
Southern California in the Rose Bowl, entered the combine as a certain top four pick, but when a score 
of 6 was reported for Young, his status as a prototype quarterback began to be questioned.  See Pete 
Doherty & Jim Wyatt, Will Wonderlic Cause Teams to Wonder about Young? (Mar. 1, 2006), 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/draft/2006-03-01-young-wonderlic_x.htm.  According to Jeep 
Chryst, a former NFL assistant attending the combine as an at-large scout, Young’s extremely low 
score “raise[d] a huge red flag.”  Id.  Different sources began to report that the test was administered or 
graded incorrectly.  Id.  Young took the test again approximately two weeks later and scored a 16, still 
below average for non-college graduates and lower than the mid-20 range that NFL teams are looking 
for in a quarterback.  Id.  
49 Michael A. McCann, The Wonderlic Test for the NFL Draft: Linking Stereotype Threat and the 
Law 26 (Oct. 1, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934307). 
50 Id. 
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Wonderlic scores.51    
Such a fall in draft standing is more likely to affect African-American 
football players, especially African-American quarterbacks who on 
average score under twenty on the Wonderlic more often than their white 
counterparts.52  To succeed in establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
impact in this context a plaintiff would have to show, through statistical 
analysis, that minority players as a group score lower than whites on the 
Wonderlic (which is undisputed),53 that they are drafted later than they 
would have been had the test not been administered, and that as a result the 
test has a disparate impact on minority players’ salaries.54   
Through empirical research conducted for this Note, I compiled 
Wonderlic scores for 104 quarterbacks from 1999 to 2006 (Figure 1).  The 
Wonderlic scores used in my analysis come from Mac Mirabile’s 
website.55  Mirabile states that his results come from personal research and 
generally reliable sources, including notes from scouts and newspaper 
articles.56  Nevertheless, because the scores are not made public knowledge 
they cannot be completely verified.57  The data confirms that there is a 
marked disparity between black and white quarterbacks.  Figure 2 shows 
the average Wonderlic scores and standard deviation by race, with number 
of observations.  This data shows that black quarterbacks score, on 
average, a full 7.75 points lower than their white counterparts on the 
Wonderlic.  In addition, there is good evidence that the higher a 
quarterback scores on the Wonderlic the earlier he is drafted.  In other 
words, NFL teams do use the Wonderlic, among other things, in 
determining draft order, and hence, in setting salary.  Figure 3 plots the 
Wonderlic score and the draft position of each of these quarterbacks.  The 
downward sloping regression line implies that as a player’s test score has a 
                                                                                                                          
51 See id. at 26–27 (noting quarterbacks Jeff Blake, Kordell Stewart, Anthony Wright, and 
Randall Cunningham’s draft status may have suffered as a result of the Wonderlic).  Blake, Stewart, 
White, and Cunningham all scored under twenty on the Wonderlic.  NFL Quarterback Wonderlic 
Scores, http://www.unc.edu/~mirabile/Wonderlic.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009). 
52 Chung, supra note 22, at 7. 
53 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
54 See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN 
THEORY AND DOCTRINE 80 (2nd ed. 2007) (“The disparity revealed by statistical evidence should be 
both statistically and practically significant . . . .”).  A successful plaintiff would also have to convince 
a court that the test was not job related and consistent with business necessity.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  
55 NFL Quarterback Wonderlic Scores, http://www.unc.edu/~mirabile/Wonderlic.htm (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2009). 
56 Id.  Although the NFL takes precautions to ensure that Wonderlic scores are not released to the 
public, as fans’ interest in the combine has increased so have leaks of individual players scores.  Sam 
Walker, The NFL’s Smartest Team, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2005 at W1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, WSJNL File (stating that National Football Scouting Inc., which runs the NFL combine, has 
closed the test to team personnel and upon the end of the combine burns the test scores on thirty-two 
DVDs and sends it by Federal Express to each team to prevent leaks).   
57 Id. 
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positive effect on his expected draft position.  The estimated equation for 
this line is  
Draft # = 165 – 1.95 x Wonderlic Score 
                            (t-stat) (t-stat) 
What this means is that a player with a Wonderlic score of 0 would be 
predicted to be drafted #165 and each additional point on the Wonderlic 
score raises a quarterback’s draft number by just under two positions.  The 
p-value (a statistic that measures the probability of obtaining a result at 
least as extreme as the one observed) for this analysis is 0.113, which is 
close to statistical significance at the ten percent level.58   
Looking at the data another way, I examined drafted quarterbacks who 
scored greater than or equal to one standard deviation above and below the 
mean score in my sample (26.25) to show the impact of the test on a 
player’s draft status and future salary (Figure 4).  This analysis did not 
show statistical significance, largely because of the small sample size and 
the substantial deviations in draft numbers within both the high-scoring 
and low-scoring groups.  The average draft position of those who scored 
greater than or equal to 33 (one standard deviation above) on the 
Wonderlic was 107.8.  Of those who scored less than or equal to 19 (one 
standard deviation below) the average draft position was 136.4.    While a 
difference of over twenty-eight draft slots is not shocking, it is also not 
insignificant—with thirty-two teams in the league, it equates to being 
drafted almost one full round later and likely having a smaller rookie 
contract.  For example, the difference in average annual salary between the 
108th pick and 137th in the 2008 NFL Draft was $69,500.59  Because black 
quarterbacks score lower on the test than whites,60 the Wonderlic would 
have a disparate impact on their salary. 
The inherent problem in making this prima facie case is that the 
Wonderlic test is not used as the sole factor to set a player’s salary.  There 
are many other factors that are used in assessing a player including speed, 
                                                                                                                          
58 The p-value measures the probability of getting a difference between the sample mean and the 
null hypothesis which is numerically greater or equal to that actually observed.  Generally, in order to 
show statistical significance the p-value must be smaller than or equal to the significance level.  See 
JOHN E. FREUND & GARY A. SIMON, MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 314 (8th ed. 1992). 
59 After being drafted 108th by the Denver Broncos, Kory Lichtensteiger signed a four-year 
$2.189 million dollar contract.  Kory Lichtensteiger, http://www.rotoworld.com/Content/player 
pages/player_main.aspx?sport=nfl&id=4816 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009); 2008 NFL Draft Round 4 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2008/draft/breakdowns/by_rounds/4.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2009).  John David Booty, drafted 137th by the Minnesota Vikings, signed a four-year $1.911 million 
dollar contract.  John David Booty, http://www.rotoworld.com/Content/playerpages/player_ 
main.aspx?sport=NFl&id=4732 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009); 2008 NFL Draft, Round 4 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2008/draft/breakdowns/by_rounds/4.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2009). 
60 Of the 103 quarterbacks sampled in the above analysis, seventy-eight white quarterbacks had an 
average score of 28.15 and twenty-five black quarterbacks had an average of 20.4.  See infra, Figure 2. 
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strength, interview skills, and college performance.61  It is concededly 
difficult for any individual player to show how heavily his Wonderlic score 
weighed in a team’s decision to not draft him.  A team can point to many 
other factors besides Wonderlic scores as reasons for not drafting a 
particular player.  However, a compelling argument has been made by Ian 
Ayres that these other factors must be ignored in a disparate impact case in 
order to determine if they cause a racial disparity.62  Ayres notes that 
controlling for non-race factors is inappropriate because the purpose of the 
analysis is to see if these non-race factors cause racial disparities.63  Thus, 
attempting to control for these other factors (college performance, physical 
tests, etc.) can bias the determination as to whether the employer’s policies 
causes an unjustified disparate impact. 
Secondly, because the NFL is more popular than ever; the demand for 
combine and draft information is insatiable, including twenty-six hours of 
live coverage of the combine on the NFL Network.64  There are many 
sources that leak Wonderlic scores to the public and the media often 
belittles players with low test results.65  It is entirely possible that as 
players’ scores become public knowledge, it could more readily affect 
teams’ decisions regarding which prospects to select, thus worsening the 
already disparate effect of the Wonderlic on future NFL players.   
IV.  LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE IMPACT IN SALARY SETTING 
Although this Note does not cover a classic disparate impact claim 
based on a facially neutral test affecting the selection rates of a protected 
class, the making of a prima facie case by a plaintiff should not be 
prohibited if he can show that the NFL’s use of the Wonderlic resulted in 
black players being drafted later and thus receiving a smaller initial 
contract.  Courts have addressed disparate impact in relation to wage in 
many circumstances, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
                                                                                                                          
61 See Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note 48 (noting that “[i]n addition to the Wonderlic, teams also 
determine a player’s intelligence through interviews and their success in school.”). 
62 Ian Ayres, Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation: 
The Problem of Included Variable Bias 2 (Dec. 28, 2003) (unpublished Yale Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 290, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=483242) 
(stating that it is “necessary to intentionally omit non-race based variables from a regression to test 
whether those variables produced a racially disparate impact.”). 
63 Id.  
64 Jon Ourand, Reebok to Sponsor NFL Network’s Scouting Combine Coverage (Feb. 15, 2008), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/118558. 
65 McCann, supra note 50 at 22 (noting that there are “myriad sources of leaks” including team 
officials, players’ agents, rival agents and players themselves).  After Vince Young scored a 6 on his 
first Wonderlic attempt, one author wrote that “Young is perceived as laying an IQ egg that might kill 
the draft goose . . . .”  Jon Saraceno, Who Knows if this Longhorn is Short on IQ, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/saraceno/2006-02-28-saraceno-
young_x.htm. 
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(ADEA) in Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi.66  That case involved a 
group of plaintiff police officers that challenged the City’s salary increases 
because they were more generous to officers under the age of forty.67  The 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ could not make a disparate impact 
claim because they did not identify a specific test, requirement, or practice 
that had an adverse impact on older workers.68  Because no prima facie 
case could be made, the Court found the City’s intention to raise salaries in 
order to become competitive with regional averages sufficiently related to 
the goal of retaining the police force and a reasonable factor other than 
age.69 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed wage-based disparate 
impact in the context of sex discrimination in American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. State of 
Washington.70  In that case, state female employees in job categories of at 
least seventy percent female brought suit alleging Title VII sex 
discrimination in compensation.71  The plaintiffs claimed that they were 
compensated at lower rates than employees in jobs where males 
predominate, although evidence existed that the jobs were of comparable 
worth.72  The court held that the decision to base compensation on market 
forces “involves the assessment of a number of complex factors not easily 
ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be appropriate for 
disparate impact analysis.”73  It further reasoned that a compensation 
system based on supply and demand is not the type of employment practice 
contemplated by Griggs because it does not constitute a single, specific 
employment practice that has a disparate impact.74 
However, the notion of disparate impact in salary setting has not been 
fully explored by the courts—in fact, after thorough research I could only 
find one case directly on point.  In Donnelly v. Rhode Island Board of 
Governors for Higher Education, certain female faculty members at the 
University of Rhode Island contended that the university’s salary plan had 
a disparate impact on women’s pay.75  The plan had progressively higher 
minimum salaries for the humanities tier, natural sciences tier, and 
business tier.76 The plaintiffs contended that because a greater percentage 
                                                                                                                          
66 Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
67 Id. at 230. 
68 Id. at 241. 
69 Id. at 242. 
70 Am. Fed. of State, County, and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d 1401, 
1403 (9th Cir. 1985). 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 1403–04. 
73 Id. at 1406. 
74 Id. 
75 Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 110 F.3d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1997). 
76 Id. at 2. 
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of women were in the lower paying tiers, this pay schedule disparately 
impacted their salaries.77  The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected their 
claim, finding that the faculty members’ choice of academic field 
combined with the national market, rather that the plan itself, was 
responsible for the differences in salary between tiers.78   
These cases, although relevant, are distinguishable from the NFL Draft 
context.  Unlike City of Jackson and AFSCME, a specific employment 
practice, namely the use of the Wonderlic, is identifiable as creating a 
disparate impact on the salaries of minority football players.  The test is 
administered to all potential draft picks and those who score lower on the 
test are, on average, drafted later and receive smaller initial contracts.79  
Also, the market forces defense is not appropriate because the NFL is a 
monopsonistic employer; there is no competitive market wage for football 
players because the NFL comprises the entire market.  Hence, the ordinary 
reply of “we’re just paying market wages” does not apply here.  Because 
potential NFL players have no equally lucrative employment opportunities, 
the league cannot justify a competitive market defense.80 
The NFL’s use of the Wonderlic is unusual because it is a factor in 
determining an employee’s salary.  An employment test is typically used, 
as mentioned in Griggs above, to see if an individual is qualified to do the 
job81—salary is then based on the job itself.  Because the NFL is such a 
unique employer it is not surprising that few cases are analogous.  
Intelligence test scores rarely determine wages; instead they are used to 
make hiring decisions.  The evidence presented in this Note shows that test 
scores are used to determine wages in the NFL.  A player that scores 
higher on the Wonderlic is, on average, drafted earlier and therefore 
receives a higher salary.  Consequently, because blacks score lower than 
whites on the Wonderlic, the test has a disparate impact on minority 
players’ salaries. 
V.  BUSINESS NECESSITY 
Once a prima facie case is established, the NFL would have the burden 
of production and persuasion to show that the use of the Wonderlic is “job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. . 
                                                                                                                          
77 Id. at 3–4. 
78 Id. at 5. 
79 See supra text accompanying notes 43–46, 51, 58–60. 
80 Ian Ayres contends that the market power defense, rooted in profitability, should be rejected by 
courts when used to extract super-competitive profits.  Paying employees less than their marginal 
product because they have few alternatives should not be a business justification.  Ian Ayres, Market 
Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard For Assessing When Disparate Impacts are 
Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673–74 (2007).  
81 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that an employment test must be 
shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to job-performance ability). 
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. . ”82  Arguably, the interpretation of the phrase “business necessity” is 
still unclear, however, because in Griggs, the terms “job-related” and 
“business necessity” were used synonymously.83  These terms can have 
entirely different levels of application, leading to different conclusions.84  
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard in Dothard v. 
Rawlinson it stated that a challenged employment practice must be 
“necessary to safe and efficient job performance,”85 but later relaxed the 
employer’s required showing in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, by 
calling for the challenged practice to “serve[], in a significant way, the 
legitimate employment goals of the employer.”86  The 1991 Civil Rights 
Act overruled that portion of Wards Cove, and returned to the “job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity” 
standard,87 but despite this, no universal definition exists.88  For example, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that in order for a cutoff score on 
a test to be job-related it must equal the minimum qualifications necessary 
to do the job.89 
It is undisputed that in some vocations a job applicant’s Wonderlic 
score meets the business necessity standard because it is a valid predictor 
of job performance.  For example, it has been used and upheld for jobs in a 
chemical manufacturing plant,90 and is routinely used to select dental 
hygienists and some entry-level workers.91  However, courts have found it 
not to be “job related” in the context of promotion within a paper mill,92 or 
in hiring employees at a power plant.93  What becomes apparent is that the 
Wonderlic’s justification under business necessity is almost never certain, 
regardless of the employment position.  Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) personnel selection guidelines require statistical 
evidence that the “selection procedure is predictive of or significantly 
correlated with important elements of job performance.”94  This section 
presents evidence that these EEOC standards are not met because 
Wonderlic scores do not predict performance in the NFL.  
                                                                                                                          
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
83 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 148. 
84 Id. at 148–52 (noting the federal appellate courts’ different interpretations of the two terms). 
85 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977). 
86 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). 
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  
88 See Ayres, supra note 80, at 670 (stating that “a persuasive answer [to the business justification 
defense] has eluded both scholars and judges.”). 
89 See Lanning v. S. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 181 F.3d 478, 489 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that a 
“discriminatory cutoff score is impermissible unless shown to measure the minimum qualifications 
necessary for successful performance of the job in question.”). 
90 Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., 519 F. Supp. 211, 214, 255 (W.D. La. 1981). 
91 Rovell, supra note 11. 
92 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435–36 (1975). 
93 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971). 
94 29 C.F.R § 1607.5(B) (2008). 
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Analysis of the “business necessity” issue in the NFL context is 
challenging because there is no uniform way that all thirty-two teams “use” 
the test.  Some teams use the information to guide selections in later rounds 
when less information is available on specific players.95  Other teams 
apparently weigh the test more heavily the closer the player is to the ball, 
under the theory that those who regularly touch the ball have to make more 
strategic decisions.96  While seemingly all coaches are skeptical of the test, 
almost all of them use it in some form while evaluating players.97  Once the 
test is shown to have a disparate impact, if it is used, the scores must 
sufficiently relate to job performance.98   
Not surprisingly, Wonderlic Inc., the company that administers the 
test, is convinced that its test meets “business necessity” standards 
primarily because of the amount of money involved in selecting a draft 
pick.99  However, such reasoning is unlikely to satisfy any definition of the 
admittedly vague phrase “business necessity.”  Others claim that due to the 
complexities of the play calling in the modern NFL, a Wonderlic score can 
point to a player’s aptitude to memorize an intricate playbook,100 but this 
assertion would have to be proven by showing that a player’s memorizing 
ability was significantly correlated with Wonderlic score.101  Either way, at 
                                                                                                                          
95 Rovell, supra note 11. 
96 See McCann, supra note 50, at 21 (noting that players who touch the ball more frequently in a 
game are required to use a higher level of thinking than those who play more physical, rudimentary, 
positions); see also Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note 48 (noting that former Baltimore Ravens coach 
Brian Billick expects quarterbacks to score higher on the Wonderlic than other positions based on their 
responsibilities on the field).  
97 Super Bowl champion coach Tony Dungy said, “The ability to win, delivering in the clutch 
cannot be measured with pen and paper . . . . We have had some really ‘Wonderlic Smart’ guys who 
turned out to be ‘football dumb.’”  See Jon Entine, Dark Thoughts, 
http://www.jonentine.com/articles/dark_thoughts_recon.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).  Nevertheless, 
Dungy still reviews every score.  Id.  Pittsburgh Steelers coach Mike Tomlin stated that “[p]ersonally, 
I’ve never been a Wonderlic guy. . . . It doesn’t measure football intelligence.  You don’t know the 
background, the way guys have prepared for the test.  You’ve got to go based on your interactions with 
people and what you see on tape.”  Corbett, supra note 5.  But see Entine, supra (noting that former 
Minnesota Vikings coach Dennis Green said regarding the Wonderlic scores, “I never pay any attention 
to them. . . . I don’t even look at the score.  The only thing I’m concerned about is how the guy has 
performed of [sic] the field.”).   
98 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
99 See Intelligence Testing, supra note 9 (noting that given the investment involved a draft pick, 
teams need all the information they can get).  Michael Callans, President of Wonderlic Consulting 
stated that“[w]hether you are hiring a mailroom clerk or a CEO, a defensive lineman or a quarterback, 
intelligence is an accurate determiner of success . . . Smart people achieve more, they are better leaders, 
and they add greater value to the company.”  Id. 
100 Walker, supra note 56 (noting that “[i]f the coach calls ‘zero type wing ride,’ for instance, each 
player has to know instantly what to do, where his teammates will be going and how to adjust to the 
other team's behavior”).  Tampa Bay Buccaneers general manager and Wonderlic proponent Bruce 
Allen, whose 2005 offensive line averaged Wonderlic scores above 30 (higher than the average 
attorney’s score) said, “You need to ‛get it’ quick . . . We don’t have a lot of patience in the NFL right 
now.”  Id. 
101 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (2008) (stating that a valid test should predict an important element 
of the job). 
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this stage the NFL would have the burden of showing a business 
justification for its use of the Wonderlic.102  When most employers’ 
selection practices are challenged, they present their own validation studies 
to the court.103  So-called “criterion validation,” which is most often used 
in evaluating tests, involves comparing test performance with the outcome 
the test is designed to predict.104 
There are two types of criterion validation: predictive and 
concurrent.105  Predictive validation would require the NFL to administer 
the Wonderlic at the combine, but not release the scores to the teams.  The 
teams would then select their draft picks and after a certain interval of 
time, job performance would be evaluated.  A comparison of predicted 
performance (based on the test score) with actual performance would be 
used to assess the test’s validity.106  If the test was not sufficiently 
correlated with actual performance it would be invalid.107  Concurrent 
validation would require that the Wonderlic be administered to players 
already in the NFL who are representative of candidates “normally 
available in the relevant labor market for the job . . . in question.”108  These 
test scores would be compared with their current level of ability.  This 
could be unnecessary because almost all players in the NFL have already 
taken the Wonderlic in preparation for the draft and a finding of job-
relatedness could be based on those earlier scores.  Moreover, scores on the 
test would not reflect work experience gained by the player already on the 
job, obfuscating the correlation between test scores and criterion.109  In 
other words, a player’s Wonderlic score might not increase corollary to his 
knowledge and expertise gained while playing in the league. 
This Note contends that neither concurrent nor predictive validation 
would show that a football player’s Wonderlic score predicts his future 
success in the NFL.  McDonald P. Mirable examined the relationship 
between “intelligence” based on the Wonderlic and football ability in NFL 
rookie quarterbacks between 1989 and 2004.110  Through empirical 
analysis he concluded that “there exists no statistically significant 
relationship between intelligence and quarterback performance at either the 
collegiate or professional level.”111  Mirabile concluded that if the 
Wonderlic had no relation to ability, the NFL would be better suited to 
                                                                                                                          
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
103 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 27.01 (2d ed. 2006). 
104 Id. at § 27.01(1). 
105 Id. 
106 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(C)(4).  
107 See id. § 1607.14(B)(5) (noting that a selection procedure is generally valid when performance 
on the procedure and performance on the measured criterion is statistically significant at the 0.05 level). 
108 Id. § 1607.14(B)(4).  
109 LARSON, supra note 103, at § 27.01(1)(b). 
110 Mirabile, supra note 14. 
111 Id. 
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spend their time and resources in some other way.112 
In order to evaluate the Wonderlic’s ability to predict a quarterback’s 
success over their career, I compiled the Wonderlic scores and 
corresponding NFL passer rating of 116 quarterbacks over the past four 
decades (Figure 5).113  The passer rating is a statistic based on four 
categories—percentage of completions per attempt, average yards gained 
per attempt, percentage of touchdown passes per attempt, and percentage 
of interceptions per attempt.114  A passer rating can range from 0.0 to 
158.3.115  The league regular season average in 2008 for qualified 
quarterbacks (defined as quarterbacks who threw at least fourteen passes 
per game played) was 84.2.116  The statistic has its weaknesses; it does not 
measure intangibles such as leadership, play calling, or meaningful 
touchdowns, but it has been consistently used since 1973.117 
Although a passer rating can be determined after a quarterback has 
thrown one attempt,118 only quarterbacks who had attempted at least 
twenty-five passes were included in my analysis to give a reasonable 
sample size.  If “intelligence” as measured by the Wonderlic was necessary 
to be a successful NFL quarterback, one would expect a positive 
correlation to exist between Wonderlic score and passer rating.  In other 
words, using Figure 6 with the X-axis representing Wonderlic score and 
the Y-axis representing NFL passer rating, there should be a positive 
relationship between the two.  It is obvious by looking at Figure 6 that such 
a relationship is not present.  Instead of a positive relationship, the 
regression line has a slightly downward (negative) trend, although the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  The linear equation for  
                                                                                                                          
112 Id. 
113 See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.   
114 NFL Quarterback Rating Formula, http://www.nfl.com/help/quarterbackratingformula (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2009). 
115 Richard Sandomir, The N.F.L.'s Passer Rating, Arcane and Misunderstood, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
14, 2004, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.  
116 Draft Order, http://www.nfl.com/stats/player (follow “complete list” hyperlink; then follow 
“regular season” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).  To compile the above statistic, I averaged the 
passer rating for every qualified quarterback.   
117 NFL Quarterback Rating Formula, supra note 114; see Sandomir, supra note 115 (noting also 
that the statistic is weighted against freewheeling quarterbacks as it rewards a high percentage of 
completions and yards per attempt while punishing interceptions). 
118 NFL Quarterback Rating Formula, supra note 114. 
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Figure 6 is  
QB Rating = 75.65 - .12 x Wonderlic Score 
         (t-stat) (t-stat) 
This means that with each point scored on the Wonderlic, a 
quarterback’s rating actually decreases by .12.  The p-value for this 
analysis was 0.491, leading to the conclusion that no statistically 
significant relationship between Wonderlic score and NFL passer rating 
exists; therefore its use would likely not meet the “business necessity” 
standard.   This evidence, while certainly not dispositive, appears to show 
that a player’s Wonderlic score has nothing to do with their ability to play 
quarterback.  And, if the Wonderlic cannot predict success for a 
quarterback then, a fortiori, it should not predict success for other, less 
intellectually demanding football positions.      
Others have also examined the relationship between Wonderlic score 
and quarterback performance, reaching different conclusions.  The 
employee testing firm Criteria Corp. found a correlation between test score 
and passing yards once a quarterback had thrown for over 1000 yards.119  
The authors of this study originally noted that no association between 
Wonderlic and passing yards could be found for the sixty-one quarterbacks 
they evaluated that were drafted from 2000–2004.120  However, once they 
included only quarterbacks who had passed for over 1000 yards, the 
authors found a correlation coefficient (otherwise known as r)121 of .51— 
showing strong positive correlation between aptitude and performance.122   
While there is perhaps some validity to this study, using passing yards 
with a 1000 yard cutoff may be misleading.  In the 2008 regular season, the 
average NFL team threw for 211.6 yards per game;123 throwing over 1000 
yards in your career means that you have played in multiple games.  Using 
passing yards as a metric is an accurate way to measure long term skill and 
durability, but conversely it brings in variables including resistance to 
injury and a team’s propensity to throw the ball, something that varies 
throughout the league and something that the Wonderlic is not designed to 
predict. 
Admittedly, passer rating may be an inaccurate measure in the case of 
a quarterback who has one good game only to be injured and never play 
                                                                                                                          
119 Criteria Employees Testing Blog, The Wonderlic as a Predictor of Performance in the NFL, 
http://blog.criteriacorp.com/blog/bid/4920/The-Wonderlic-as-a-Predictor-of-Performance-in-the-NFL 
120 Id. 
121 The correlation coefficient, or r, is a common measure of the correlation between two 
variables.  Ranging from -1 to +1, it measures the strength of linear dependence.  See FREUND & 
SIMON, supra note 58, at 470–71.   
122 Criteria Employees Testing Blog, supra note 119. 
123 To reach this number I averaged the passing yards per game average of all thirty-two NFL 
teams.  The statistics I used are available at http://www.teamrankings.com/nfl/stats/?cat=team& 
pan=7&conf=0. 
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again, or for a quarterback who is benched upon the return of the team’s 
regular starter.  Yet in today’s NFL the demand for decent quarterback 
play is so high that even one well played game may be enough to lead to 
future opportunity.  Because quarterback rating is normalized per passing 
attempt and is less affected by a team’s offensive scheme, it is a better 
gauge of a quarterback’s ability for this study than passing yards.  It 
provides a standardized method of comparing Wonderlic performance to 
in-game performance.  As the above analysis shows, no statistically 
significant relationship between Wonderlic score and quarterback 
performance can be found, thus the test would be unlikely to meet 
“business necessity.” 
VI.  THE CASE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TEST 
In the unlikely event that NFL’s use of the Wonderlic test were found 
to be justified under the “business necessity” standard, plaintiffs would still 
be entitled to offer an alternative selection practice that meets the 
employer’s legitimate interests while having a less discriminatory effect.124  
It must be noted that courts are generally apprehensive to mandate 
alternative hiring practices because they are “less competent than 
employers to restructure business practices . . . .”125  Also, the burden rests 
squarely on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that this alternative practice exists 
and that it would have less of a disparate impact on the protected class.126 
Despite the plaintiff carrying this burden, there is some evidence of a 
responsibility on the part of an employee who uses a selection procedure to 
investigate alternatives and choose the one with the least discriminatory 
impact.127  The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 
state that when a validity study is called for, the employer should include 
“an investigation of suitable alternative selection procedures and suitable 
alternative methods of using the selection procedure which has as little 
adverse impact as possible . . . .”128  Once the employer has made a 
“reasonable effort to become aware of such alternative procedures and 
validity has been demonstrated in accord with these guidelines, the use of 
the test or other selection procedure may continue until such time as it 
should reasonably be reviewed for currency.”129  Although the Guidelines 
themselves cannot impose an obligation on the employer to investigate 
alternatives, they may not be ignored by the employer either.130  Courts 
                                                                                                                          
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)(2006). 
125 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978). 
126 LARSON, supra note 103, at § 24.01. 
127 Id. at § 24.02. 
128 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(B). 
129 Id.  
130 LARSON, supra note 103, at § 24.02. 
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have generally given little weight to the Guidelines’ directive and 
alternative testing techniques proposed by plaintiffs rarely prevail,131 
because they are usually unable to show that their plan would have a less 
discriminatory effect or that it would serve the employer’s purposes.132 
In Murphy v. Derwinski,133 the plaintiff was able to show an alternative 
selection practice that the court found to meet the employer’s goals.  In that 
case, the plaintiff applied for employment as a Roman Catholic chaplain at 
a VA hospital in Colorado but was rejected because she was not ordained 
and did not have an ecclesiastical endorsement—a Veteran Administration 
requirement.134  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
requirement had a disparate impact on women because the plaintiff, as a 
woman, was unable to be ordained a priest.135   
Although the court found that the decision could be justified by 
business necessity, it ruled that requiring only the ecclesiastical 
endorsement standard would ensure that the hospital’s patients receive 
effective spiritual service while simultaneously not having a disparate 
impact on women.136  In support of their conclusion, the court noted that 
women serve as Roman Catholic chaplains in non-VA hospitals “without 
disruption of service.137 
Building on the case law mentioned above, this Note contends the NFL 
should abandon its use of the Wonderlic test and replace it with a football-
specific intelligence test that (like the ecclesiastical endorsement 
requirement) could equally serve the NFL’s interest in evaluating a 
player’s mental acumen.  This Note does not dispute the NFL’s need to 
measure intelligence in order to provide more information to teams before 
they make their draft choices.  Players spend hours in meetings every day 
and must know their responsibilities inside out.138  However, a player’s 
answer on a question such as “[p]aper sells for 21 cents per pad. What will 
four pads cost?” is not optimally designed to determine how well a player 
will receive instruction from coaches, associate with teammates, or learn a 
playbook.139  Legal arguments aside, a football-specific test would provide 
more useful information for teams in assessing players.  There is evidence 
that some teams have already implemented such tests into their evaluation 
                                                                                                                          
131 Id. at § 24.03. 
132 Id. 
133 Murphy v. Derwinski, 990 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1993). 
134 Id. at 542. 
135 Id. at 544–45. 
136 Id. at 545–46.  
137 Id at 545. 
138 Elizabeth Merill, In NFL, the Playbook is Sacred, ESPN, Aug. 29, 2007, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/preview07/news/story?id=2973338. 
139 See So, how do you score?, http://espn.go.com/page2/s/closer/020228test.html (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2009) (providing fifteen sample Wonderlic questions). 
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process, although few details are known as to what is tested.140 
The football-specific intelligence test this Note recommends would 
require players at the combine to study, based on their position, plays in a 
playbook upon which they would later be tested.  Each team places great 
emphasis on players understanding their respective playbooks—some can 
be 800 pages in length and require two years study for full assimilation.141  
Because agents, in preparation for the Wonderlic, frequently have their 
players take a practice version of the test before the combine,142 in similar 
fashion, a prospect under this Note’s recommendation would receive, 
before the combine, a basic playbook to study in order to prepare for the 
test. 
The test could be administered in twelve minutes, identical to the 
Wonderlic, but would assess players’ abilities to match specific names of 
plays with their corresponding diagram.  It could also give a name of a 
play and ask a player to choose a multiple choice answer that best 
describes the basic purpose of the play—whether it be a screen pass, play 
action, draw, or any other formation.  The test would evaluate a player’s 
ability to think quickly, but in relation to information that they will actually 
have to learn in order to play in the NFL. 
Unfortunately, no promise can be made that such a test would not 
continue to have a disparate impact on minority football players.  
However, the test would be more likely to meet the business necessity 
standard and would represent a good-faith attempt to put all potential 
draftees on equal footing.  Despite the courts’ unwillingness to make 
business decisions for employers, it is entirely possible that a plaintiff 
could show that a football-specific intelligence would be justified under 
“business necessity,” while possibly not discriminating. 
The NFL should not wait for legal challenge to begin investigating 
different testing methods, but should take the initiative themselves, under 
the Guidelines mentioned above, to develop a test that can accurately 
predict football success by measuring the skills necessary to play the game.  
The league should begin this process through an employment study known 
as job analysis.  Job analysis is a survey that establishes whether a 
challenged employment practice sufficiently predicts success on the job by 
determining what actually is required by the job.143  It is often conducted 
                                                                                                                          
140 See Corbett, supra note 5 (noting that New York Jets general manager Mike Tannenbaum and 
former head coach Eric Mangini ask prospects game-related football questions in quick fashion, as well 
as fire questions at them while watching college game film); see also Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note 
49 (stating that Houston Texans general manager Charley Casserly uses another test that “relates more 
to football.”). 
141 Merill, supra note 138. 
142 See Dougherty & Wyatt, supra note 48 (stating that because of the emphasis placed on the 
Wonderlic, most agents ensure their clients take practice versions of the test).  
143 LARSON, supra note 103, at § 27.05[1]. 
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through interviews with employers and employees and observing 
employees while on the job.144  The league could conduct interviews with 
teams to determine how football “intelligence” is best measured and from 
that information develop a league-wide test administered at the combine.  
Such a test might be slightly different from the one proposed above, but 
having standardized results that are applicable to each prospect would 
serve the NFL’s interest. 
Finally, the question of why a potential NFL player has not yet 
challenged the use of the Wonderlic must be addressed.  I contend that a 
player who is ultimately drafted in the first four rounds (out of a total of 
seven), although perhaps negatively affected by the Wonderlic, is not 
likely to contest its use even if they have a valid prima facie case.  These 
players usually have some form of commitment from the team that drafted 
them and the negative impact a lawsuit would have on their reputation 
might not make it a prudent career move.  However, a minority player who 
scored poorly on the Wonderlic and was drafted in the late rounds or not 
drafted at all might be more willing to challenge its use.  The reasoning for 
this is simple: the employment substitutes available to a player if they do 
not make the NFL, especially if they did not complete their degree, have 
drastically different levels of compensation.  Take an average player for 
example: Leroy Harris, selected in the middle of the fourth round by the 
Tennessee Titans in 2007, received a four-year $2.11 million dollar 
contract.145  If the next best alternative to an NFL career is a salary of 
$15,000 a year, a potential draft pick who was denied a spot in the NFL 
because of his low Wonderlic score could find litigation appealing and 
may even be wise to pursue it.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Because of the Wonderlic’s racially-different results, the test almost 
certainly has a disparate impact on minority players’ salary opportunities in 
the NFL.  Potential draft picks with higher Wonderlic scores are drafted 
earlier, increasing their initial professional salaries.  Black quarterbacks 
who, on average, score lower on the test may be financially punished by it.  
As shown above, the test does not meet the “business necessity” standard 
because it cannot reliably predict job performance.  In fact, it appears that 
the higher a quarterback scores on the Wonderlic the worse they perform 
on the field, and therefore it cannot be justified as representing the 
minimum intelligence standards necessary for the job.  This Note argues 
that the league should abandon its use of the Wonderlic and instead 
                                                                                                                          
144 Id. 
145 Leroy Harris Player Page http://www.rotoworld.com/Content/playerpages/player_ 
contract.aspx?sport=NFL&id=4311; SI.com 2007 NFL Draft, Round 4 http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com 
/football/2007/draft/breakdowns/by_round/4.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).  
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administer a football-related “intelligence” test to potential players.  This 
test might not have a disparate impact on minorities and would more likely 
be justifiable under business necessity.  Perhaps most importantly it could 
provide the most relevant information in evaluating a football player’s 
ability. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: 1999–2006 Quarterback Score and Draft Position 
 
Drew Henson 42 192
Alex Smith 40 1 
Eli Manning 39 1 
Todd Husak 39 202
Charlie Frye 38 67 
Craig Krenzel 38 148
Ryan Fitzpatrick 38 250
Omar Jacobs 36 164
Aaron Rodgers 35 24 
Drew Stanton 35 43 
J.T. O'Sullivan 35 186
Kellen Clemens 35 49 
Matt Leinart 35 10 
Charlie Whitehurst 33 81 
Tom Brady 33 199
Giovanni Carmazzi 32 65 
Jesse Palmer 32 125
Joey Harrington 32 3 
Patrick Ramsey 32 32 
Sage Rosenfels 32 109
Andrew Walter 31 69 
Craig Nall 31 164
Dave Ragone 31 88 
J.P. Losman 31 22 
Kliff Kingsbury 31 201
Kurt Kittner 31 158
Matt Schaub 31 90 
Ingle Martin 30 148
John Beck 30 40 
Josh Heupel 30 177
Josh McCown 30 81 
Matt Mauck 30 225
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Philip Rivers 30 4 
Quincy Carter 30 8 
Stefan LeFors 30 121
Brady Quinn 29 22 
Chris Weinke 29 106
Mark Bulger 29 168
Rex Grossman 29 22 
Brian St. Pierre 28 163
Brooks Bollinger 28 200
Cade McNown 28 12 
Drew Brees 28 32 
Kevin Kolb 28 36 
Seth Burford 28 216
Josh Booty 27 162
Kyle Boller 27 19 
Mike McMahon 27 149
Tim Rattay 27 212
Adrian McPherson 26 152
Akili Smith 26 3 
Carson Palmer 26 1 
Dan Orlovsky  26 145
Jay Cutler 26 11 
Kyle Orton 26 106
Ben Roethlisberger 25 11 
Bradlee Van Pelt 25 250
Brock Huard 25 77 
Byron Leftwich 25 7 
Casey Bramlett 25 218
Chad Pennington 25 18 
Joe Germaine 25 101
Josh Harris  25 187
Ken Dorsey 25 241
Randy Fasani 25 137
Shaun King 25 50 
Spergon Wynn 25 183
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David Carr 24 1 
Jamarcus Russell 24 1 
John Navarre 24 202
Luke McCown 24 106
Marques Tuiasosopo 24 59 
James Killian 23 229
Jason Campbell 23 25 
Jeff Smoker 23 201
Jordan Palmer 23 205
B.J. Symons 22 248
Chris Simms 22 97 
Tim Couch 22 1 
Jeff Rowe 21 151
Scott Covington 21 245
Tyler Thigpen 21 217
Cody Pickett 20 217
Corey Jenkins  20 181
David Greene 20 85 
Michael Vick 20 1 
A.J. Feeley 19 155
Bruce Gradkowski 19 194
Derek Anderson 19 213
D.J. Shockley 19 223
Tavaris Jackson 19 33 
Daunte Culpepper 18 11 
Jarious Jackson 18 214
Joe Hamilton 18 234
Aaron Brooks 17 131
Rohan Davey 17 117
Chris Redman 16 75 
Vince Young 16 3 
Jim Sorgi 15 193
David Garrard 14 108
Donovan McNabb 14 2 
Seneca Wallace 14 110
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Tee Martin 11 163
Michael Bishop 10 277
 
 
Figure 2: Wonderlic Score by Race 
 
 Average Score Standard 
Deviation 
# of Observations 
White 28.15 5.70 78 
Black 20.4 6.08 25 
 
 
Figure 3: 1999-2006 Quarterback Wonderlic Score vs. NFL Draft Position 
 
Figure 4: Average Draft Position When Wonderlic Score is One Standard 
Deviation Above and Below the Mean 
 
 One Std. Deviation 
Above 
One Std. Deviation 
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Wonderlic Score  ≥33 ≤19 
Draft Postion 107.8 136.4 
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Figure 5: Quarterback Wonderlic Score and NFL Passer Rating 
 
Hugh Millen 41 73.5 
Alex Smith 40 63.5 
Eli Manning 39 73.4 
Brian Griese 39 83.6 
Charlie Frye 38 70.1 
Ryan Fitzpatrick 38 58.2 
Craig Krenzel 38 52.5 
Tony Romo 37 96.5 
Drew Bledsoe 36 77.1 
Anthony Dilweg 36 72.3 
Jason Garrett 36 83.2 
Matt Leinart 35 71.2 
Kellen Clemens 35 60.7 
Aaron Rodgers 35 73.3 
Steve Stenstrom 35 62.5 
Tom Brady 33 92.9 
Steve Young 33 96.8 
Joey Harrington 32 69.4 
Patrick Ramsey  32 74.8 
Sage Rosenfels 32 82 
Jesse Palmer 32 59.8 
Andrew Walter 31 56.3 
J.P. Losman 31 77.3 
Matt Schaub 31 80.7 
Rick Mirer 31 63.5 
John Beck 30 62 
Philip Rivers 30 86.6 
Josh McCown 30 71.6 
Quincy Carter 30 71.7 
Kerry Collins 30 73.3 
David Klingler 30 65.1 
Rex Grossman 29 70.9 
Chris Weinke 29 62.2 
Mark Bulger 29 88.1 
Matt Hasselbeck 29 86.2 
Bill Musgrave  29 71 
Troy Aikman 29 81.6 
John Elway 29 79.9 
B. Bollinger 28 75.2 
Drew Brees 28 87.9 
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Doug Johnson 28 69.4 
Cade McNown 28 67.7 
Peyton Manning 28 94.7 
Kyle Boller 27 71.9 
Mike McMahon 27 55.1 
Tim Rattay 27 81.9 
Ryan Leaf 27 50 
Kelly Stouffer 27 54.5 
Rich Gannon 27 84.7 
Jay Cutler 26 88.2 
Kyle Orton 26 62.2 
Jared Lorenzen 26 58.3 
Carson Palmer 26 90.1 
Akili Smith 26 52.8 
Tony Banks 26 72.4 
Rob Johnson 26 83.6 
Rodney Peete 26 73.3 
Ben 
Roethlisberger 25 92.5 
Bradlee Van Pelt 25 39.6 
Byron Leftwich 25 79.7 
Ken Dorsey 25 63.5 
Randy Fasani 25 42.8 
Shaun Hilll 25 
101.
3 
Chad Pennington 25 88.9 
Spergon Wynn 25 39.5 
Shaun King 25 73.4 
Brock Huard 25 80.3 
Danny Wuerffel 25 56.4 
Brodie Croyle 24 65.8 
Luke McCown 24 75.5 
John Navarre 24 43.9 
David Carr 24 74.4 
Marques 
Tuiasosopo 24 48 
Billy J. Tolliver 24 67.7 
Jamarcus Russell 24 55.9 
Jason Campbell 23 77.3 
Tim Hasselbeck 23 63.6 
Chris Simms 22 71.2 
Tim Couch 22 75.1 
Trent Dilfer 22 70.2 
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Mark Brunell 22 84.2 
Brett Favre 22 85.7 
Chris Miller 22 74.9 
Don Majkowski 21 72.9 
Cody Pickett 20 16.4 
Michael Vick 20 75.7 
Tavaris Jackson 19 69 
Bruce 
Gradkowski 19 65 
Derek Anderson 19 78.9 
AJ Feeley 19 69.6 
Cleo Lemon 18 72.2 
Daunte 
Culpepper 18 89.9 
Ray Lucas 18 74.3 
Aaron Brooks 17 78.5 
Jeff Blake 17 78 
Vinny 
Testaverde 17 75 
Vince Young 16 69 
Chris Redman 16 79.5 
Anthony Wright 16 66.3 
Heath Shuler 16 54.3 
Elvis Grbac 16 79.6 
Jim Sorgi 15 90.4 
Steve McNair 15 82.8 
Randall 
Cunningham 15 81.5 
Jim Kelly 15 84.4 
Dan Marino 15 86.4 
Terry Bradshaw 15 70.9 
Seneca Wallace 14 78.9 
David Garrard 14 87.7 
Donovan 
McNabb 14 85.8 
Charlie Batch 14 77.9 
Kordell Stewart 14 70.7 
Neil O'Donnell 13 81.8 
Jeff George 10 80.4 
Vince Evans 8 63 
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Figure 6: Wonderlic Score vs. NFL Passer Rating 
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